# Europakommissionens beslut den 6 mars 1989 i målet SCHIEFER mot Tyskland (nr 13389/87)

- Rubrik i HUDOC: SCHIEFER v. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- Slag: Europakommissionens beslut · språk: engelska · datum: 1989-03-06
- Ansökningsnummer: 13389/87
- ECLI: ECLI:CE:ECHR:1989:0306DEC001338987
- Artiklar (HUDOC): 7, 7-1, 11, 11-1, 11-2
- Slutsats (HUDOC): Inadmissible
- Källa: Europadomstolen (HUDOC), © ECHR-CEDH: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-1069
- Ratio Lex: https://ratiolex.se/internationell-ratt/europadomstolen/001-1069/

Elektronisk version. Den undertecknade texten i domstolens arkiv är den autentiska (art. 44.3 EKMR).

## AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 13389/87  
by Hermann SCHIEFER  
against the Federal Republic of Germany

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private  
on 6 March 1989, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President  
J.A. FROWEIN  
S. TRECHSEL  
G. SPERDUTI  
E. BUSUTTIL  
G. JÖRUNDSSON  
A. WEITZEL  
J.-C. SOYER  
H.G. SCHERMERS  
H. DANELIUS  
G. BATLINER  
Sir  Basil HALL  
MM.  F. MARTINEZ  
C.L. ROZAKIS  
Mrs.  J. LIDDY  
Mr.  L. LOUCAIDES

Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the  
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 18 September 1987  
by Hermann Schiefer against the Federal Republic of Germany and  
registered on 13 November 1987 under file No. 13389/87;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the  
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

## THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the  
applicant, may be summarised as follows:

The applicant, born in 1958, is a German national and resident  
at Fröndenberg.  He is a student.  Before the Commission he is  
represented by Mr.  R. Schön, a lawyer practising in Cologne.

On 29 February 1984 the Schwäbisch Gmünd District Court  
(Amtsgericht), in summary proceedings, convicted the applicant of  
having committed unlawful coercion (Nötigung) under S. 240 of the  
German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) on three counts.  He was fined  
DM 900.

S. 240 of the Criminal Code provides:

<German>

"(1) Wer einen anderen rechtswidrig mit Gewalt oder durch Drohung  
mit einem empfindlichen Übel zu einer Handlung, Duldung oder  
Unterlassung nötigt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei  
Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe, in besonders schweren Fällen mit  
Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren bestraft.

(2) Rechtswidrig ist die Tat, wenn die Anwendung der Gewalt oder  
die Androhung des Übels zu dem angestrebten Zweck als  
verwerflich anzusehen ist.

(3) Der Versuch ist strafbar."

<Translation>

"(1) Anybody who coerces another to do something, tolerate  
something or omit to do something by force or dangerous  
threats shall be punished with imprisonment up to three years  
or a fine, in specially aggravated cases with imprisonment  
from six months to five years.

(2) The act shall be unlawful only if the application of the force  
or the dangerous threat to the desired end is blameworthy.

(3) An attempt is punishable."

On 18 October 1984, the Schwäbisch Gmünd District Court, upon  
the applicant's appeal (Einspruch), held trial and convicted him of  
unlawful coercion on two counts.  He was fined DM 800 (40 day rates of  
DM 20).

The District Court found that the applicant had participated  
in demonstrations in front of the US military barracks at Mutlangen on  
7 and 11 December 1983 in order to protest against nuclear armament.  
The applicant and other demonstrators had blocked the road to the  
barracks for several minutes and thus prevented military cars from  
using the road.  The police had three times ordered that the  
demonstrators should leave the road.  The applicant and others who did  
not comply with this order were then carried away.

The District Court considered that the sit-ins on the approach  
road to the US military barracks in Mutlangen constituted coercion by  
force within the meaning of S. 240 of the Criminal Code.  Furthermore,  
the Court was of the opinion that coercion of others in order only to  
get public attention for one's political aims was blameworthy within  
the meaning of S. 240 para. 2 of the Criminal Code.

On 10 April 1985 the Ellwangen Regional Court (Landgericht)  
dismissed the applicant's appeal (Berufung); however, the amount of  
the day rates was reduced to DM 10.  The Regional Court considered in  
particular that the applicant and the other participants in the  
sit-ins on 7 and 11 December 1983 had used force to prevent the  
drivers of military cars from using the road.  Furthermore, the  
Regional Court, having regard to the right to freedom of expression  
and the right to peaceful assembly as guaranteed by the Basic Law  
(Grundgesetz), found that, in a democratic society, the use of force  
in order to influence public opinion could not be tolerated.

On 19 July 1985 the Stuttgart Court of Appeal (Oberlandes-  
gericht) dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law (Revision).

On 25 May 1987 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesver-  
fassungsgericht) refused to admit the applicant's constitutional  
complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde).  It found that the decisive issues  
under the Basic Law had already been decided by the Court in its  
judgment of 11 November 1986, and that the applicant's complaint  
offered as little prospect of success as those constitutional  
complaints which had been rejected by the above judgment.

In the above judgment of 11 November 1986 the Federal  
Constitutional Court had dismissed several constitutional complaints  
of persons who had participated in sit-ins and then been convicted of  
unlawful coercion by force.  It could not find a violation of the  
Basic Law due to equality of votes.

In this very detailed judgment of 57 pages, the Constitutional  
Court observed that the legal opinions in jurisprudence and doctrine  
as regards sit-ins were divergent.  It found that the definition of  
unlawful coercion in S. 240 of the Criminal Code was sufficiently  
concrete and did not violate the requirements of legal certainty  
(Bestimmtheitsgebot), as derived from Article 103 para. 2 of the Basic  
Law (Grundgesetz).  However, the application and interpretation of S.  
240 of the Criminal Code by the German courts could raise problems  
with regard to the prohibition of defining crimes by analogy with  
existing offences (Analogieverbot), also derived from Article 103  
para. 2 of the Basic Law.

Article 103 para. 2 of the Basic Law provides that an act can  
be punished only if it was an offence against the law before the act  
was committed.

The Federal Constitutional Court noted that the term "force"  
in S. 240 para. 1 of the Criminal Code was initially interpreted as  
use of physical force by the offender in order to overcome actual or  
probable resistance (Entfaltung von körperlicher Kraft durch den Täter  
zur Überwindung eines geleisteten oder erwarteten Widerstands).  In  
subsequent cases the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) held  
that there was also "use of force where the offender acts in such a  
way as to cause the victim's resistance (actual or probable) to be  
overcome by an agent acting directly on the victim, the amount of  
physical force used being irrelevant" ("Gewalt liegt auch vor, wenn  
der Täter durch körperliche Handlungen die Ursache dafür setzt, daß  
der wirkliche oder erwartete Widerstand des Angegriffenen durch ein  
unmittelbar auf dessen Körper einwirkendes Mittel gebrochen oder  
verhindert wird, gleichviel, ob der Täter dazu größere oder nur  
geringere Körperkraft braucht").  Finally, in a decision of 1969  
concerning sit-ins, the Federal Court of Justice considered to be  
decisive that there was "an effect which inevitably influenced the  
victim's freedom to decide or to turn ideas into actions" ("eine die  
Freiheit der Willensentschließung oder Willensbetätigung beeinträch-  
tigende Zwangswirkung"); it was "sufficient that the offender, with  
only a minimal expenditure of energy, set up a process which acted  
conclusively on the victim's mind, thereby compelling him to act in a  
particular way" ("es genügt, daß der Täter mit nur geringem Kraft-  
aufwand einen lediglich psychisch determinierten Prozeß in Lauf setzt  
und dadurch einen unwiderstehlichen Zwang auf den Genötigten ausübt").

Four judges of the Constitutional Court found that the  
application of S. 240 of the Criminal Code to sit-ins such as in the  
present case was incompatible with the prohibition of defining crimes  
by analogy to existing offences under Article 103 para. 2 of the Basic  
law.  The progressively broader interpretation of the term "force"  
under S. 240 of the Criminal Code had not been foreseeable for the  
citizen.  The context of S. 240 para. 1 clearly indicated that not any  
coercion was deemed to be punishable, but only coercion by "force" or  
"dangerous threats".  They considered that the participants of the  
sit-ins in question did not use force, but, after sitting down on the  
road, they remained completely passive.  Moreover, it had not been  
established that any driver had felt compelled to stop by the sit-ins.

In the opinion of the four other judges the broad  
interpretation by German courts of the term "force" in S. 240  para. 1  
of the Criminal Code cannot be objected to under constitutional law.  It  
observed the limits of the ordinary meaning of the term "force" as long  
as an expenditure of energy in the process of compelling the victim  
was required.  Furthermore, having regard to the jurisprudence of the  
German courts in such matters, the risk of penalty for behaviour such  
as in the present case was foreseeable.

Furthermore, the Constitutional Court unanimously found that  
an act of "coercion by force" in the broad interpretation of S. 240  
para. 1 of the Criminal Code should, however, not automatically be  
considered unlawful.  The unlawfulness had to be established  
separately under S. 240 para. 2.  The judges disagreed about whether  
sit-ins were "blameworthy".

Four of the judges found that sit-ins such as in the present  
case, which intended to force public attention towards protest against  
nuclear armament, were in principle not blameworthy.

The four other judges found that the application of S. 240  
para. 2 of the Criminal Code, notably the assessment of the particular  
circumstances of a case, were the task of the criminal courts.  The  
conviction in the present case did not arbitrarily disregard any  
constitutional right.  The right to peaceful assembly under Article 8  
of the Basic Law would not justify sit-ins which aimed principally at  
obstructing the traffic and were lawfully dispersed by the police.  
Furthermore sit-ins could not be justified as measures of "civil  
disobedience" ("ziviler Ungehorsam"), i.e. sensational action in  
breach of law (aufsehenerregende Regelverletzung) in order to protest  
against national policy.  
COMPLAINTS

**1.** The applicant complains under Article 7 of the Convention that  
his participation in the sit-ins in front of the US military barracks  
at Mutlangen, although not constituting a criminal offence under  
German penal law, was treated, by analogy to the criminal offence of  
"coercion by force", as punishable under S. 240 of the Criminal Code.

**2.** The applicant also complains under Article 11 of the  
Convention that his conviction for unlawful coercion violates his  
right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

## THE LAW

1.      The applicant complains under Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention that  
his conviction by the Schwäbisch Gmünd District Court on 18 October 1984 and  
the Ellwangen Regional Court on 10 April 1985 for his participation in two  
sit-ins was based on an unlawful analogy to the existing offence of unlawful  
coercion by force under S. 240 of the German Criminal Code.

Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention reads as follows:

"No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on  
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a  
criminal offence under national or international law at the  
time when it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be  
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the  
criminal offence was committed."

In the sphere of criminal law Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the  
Convention confirms the general principle that legal provisions which  
interfere with individual rights must be adequately accessible, and  
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate  
his conduct (cf.  Eur.  Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 April  
1979, Series A No. 30, p. 31, para. 49).  Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the  
Convention prohibits in particular that existing offences be extended  
to cover facts which previously clearly did not constitute a criminal  
offence.  This implies that constituent elements of an offence may not  
be essentially changed by the case-law of the domestic courts.  It is  
not objectionable that the existing elements of the offence are  
clarified and adapted to new circumstances which can reasonably be  
brought under the original concept of the offence (cf.  No. 8710/79,  
Dec. 7.5.82, D.R. 28 p. 77).

The Commission notes that the Schwäbisch Gmünd District Court  
and the Ellwangen Regional Court convicted the applicant of unlawful  
coercion by force under S. 240 of the Criminal Code.  Both Courts  
found in particular that the applicant, who had participated in  
sit-ins on 7 and 11 December 1983, prevented others by "force" from  
using the road concerned.  The Federal Constitutional Court, in its  
decision of 25 May 1987 in the applicant's case, referred to its  
detailed judgment of 11 November 1986.  In that judgment the Federal  
Constitutional Court had stated that the jurisprudence of the German  
penal courts had progressively developed the interpretation of the  
term "force" in the context of S. 240 of the Criminal Code.  The  
Constitutional Court had not found a violation of the Basic Law due to  
equality of votes as regards, inter alia, the question whether or not  
this jurisprudence violated the prohibition against defining crimes by  
analogy to existing offences.  
The Commission considers that the progressively broader  
interpretation of the term "force" within the context of S. 240 of the  
Criminal Code, which covers, inter alia, sit-ins as in the applicant's  
case, has adapted the offence of "unlawful coercion by force" to new  
circumstances and developments in society which can still reasonably  
be brought under the original concept of the offence.  The  
applicability of S. 240 of the Criminal Code to sit-ins was clarified  
by the Federal Court of Justice in 1969 and, although the legal  
opinions remained divergent in this respect, the applicant could  
thus clearly foresee the risk of punishment for his participation in  
the sit-ins of 7 and 11 December 1983.

Consequently, the Commission finds that there is no appearance of a  
violation of Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention.  It follows that  
the applicant's complaint in this respect is manifestly ill-founded within the  
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.      Furthermore, the applicant complains that his conviction by the  
Schwäbisch Gmünd District Court on 18 October 1984 and the Ellwangen Regional  
Court on 10 April 1985 for his participation in two sit-ins violated his right  
to freedom of peaceful assembly as guaranteed by Article 11 (Art. 11) of the  
Convention.

Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention provides:

"1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and  
to freedom of association with others, ...

2.   No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these  
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary  
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or  
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the  
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the  
rights and freedoms of others. ..."

The Commission considers that the right to freedom of peaceful  
assembly is secured to everyone who organises or participates in a  
peaceful demonstration.  The notion of "peaceful assembly" does not,  
however, cover a demonstration where the organisers and participants  
have violent intentions which result in public disorder (cf.  
No. 8440/78, Dec. 16.7.80, D.R. 21 p. 138).

In the present case, the Commission notes that the  
participants of the demonstrations in front of the Mutlangen military  
barracks on 7 and 11 December 1983, including the applicant, intended  
to demonstrate in particular by means of sit-ins blocking the approach  
road to the barracks concerned and did thereby act illegally.

However, the Commission finds that the right to freedom of  
peaceful assembly is one of the foundations of a democratic society  
(No. 8191/78, Dec. 10.10.79, D.R. 17 p. 93) and should not be  
interpreted restrictively.  The applicant and the other demonstrators  
had not been actively violent in the course of the sit-ins concerned.  
The Commission accepts that the applicant's conviction under S. 240  
of the Criminal Code interfered with his right under Article 11 para.  
1 (Art. 11-1) and needs to be justified as a restriction prescribed by law and  
necessary in a democratic society for one of the purposes set out in  
Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) of the Convention.  
The Commission, referring to its findings as regards the  
applicant's complaint under Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention,  
considers that his conviction for coercion within the meaning of  
S. 240 of the Criminal Code was a restriction on his right to freedom  
of peaceful assembly, prescribed by German law.

Furthermore, the Commission finds that, in the circumstances  
of the present case, the applicant's conviction for having  
participated in sit-ins can reasonably be considered as necessary in  
a democractic society for the prevention of disorder and crime.  In  
this respect, the Commission considers especially that the applicant  
had not been punished for his participation in any demonstration as  
such, but for particular behaviour in the course of the demonstration,  
namely the blocking of a public road, thereby causing more obstruction  
than would normally arise from the exercise of the right of peaceful  
assembly.  The applicant and the other demonstrators had thereby  
intended to attract broader public attention to their political  
opinions concerning nuclear armament.  However, balancing the public  
interest in the prevention of disorder and the interest of the  
applicant and the other demonstrators of choosing the particular form  
of a sit-in, the applicant's conviction for the criminal offence of  
unlawful coercion does not appear disproportionate to the aims  
pursued.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly  
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the  
Convention.

## For these reasons, the Commission

## DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

## (H. C. KRÜGER)                       (C. A. NØRGAARD)

