# Europakommissionens beslut den 31 augusti 1994 i målet O'REILLY mot Irland (nr 21624/93)

- Rubrik i HUDOC: O'REILLY v. IRELAND
- Slag: Europakommissionens beslut · språk: engelska · datum: 1994-08-31
- Ansökningsnummer: 21624/93
- ECLI: ECLI:CE:ECHR:1994:0831DEC002162493
- Artiklar (HUDOC): 6, 6-1
- Slutsats (HUDOC): Admissible
- Källa: Europadomstolen (HUDOC), © ECHR-CEDH: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-1925
- Ratio Lex: https://ratiolex.se/internationell-ratt/europadomstolen/001-1925/

Elektronisk version. Den undertecknade texten i domstolens arkiv är den autentiska (art. 44.3 EKMR).

## AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 21624/93  
by Patrick O'REILLY  
against Ireland

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting  
in private on 31 August 1994, the following members being present:

MM.   A. WEITZEL, President  
C.L. ROZAKIS  
F. ERMACORA  
E. BUSUTTIL  
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK  
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ  
B. MARXER  
B. CONFORTI  
N. BRATZA  
I. BÉKÉS  
E. KONSTANTINOV

Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to the application introduced on 24 September 1992  
by Patrick O'REILLY against Ireland and registered on 6 April 1993  
under file No. 21624/93;

Having regard to:

-     reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the  
Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on  
5 April 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the  
applicant on 3 June 1994;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

## THE FACTS

The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be  
summarised as follows.

The applicant is an Irish citizen born in 1957 and is currently  
serving a sentence of imprisonment at Cork Prison. He is represented  
before the Commission by Mr. Noel Forde, a solicitor practising in East  
Cork.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

On 12 December 1984, the applicant was arrested pursuant to  
section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939 ("the 1939  
Act"), on suspicion of having committed a scheduled offence under the  
1939 Act. The applicant made a statement while in custody admitting his  
participation in the crime.

On 13 December 1984 and on 18 January 1985, the applicant was  
charged with burglary and murder respectively both of which charges  
arose out of the same event.

On 25 January 1985 the applicant was released on bail.

On or about 24 April 1985, the Book of Evidence, in respect of  
both charges, was served on the applicant and a number of witness  
statements were taken on deposition in May 1985.

In June 1985, the case was pronounced ready for trial and the  
applicant was returned for trial to the Central Criminal Court ("the  
C.C.C."). In July 1985, the applicant's trial date was fixed by the  
C.C.C. for 2 December 1985.

On 29 November 1985 the Director of Public Prosecutions  
("D.P.P."), applied for and obtained an order separating the murder and  
burglary proceedings and the trial of the burglary charge was  
adjourned. Counsel for the applicant did not oppose the separation of  
the two proceedings nor the consequent adjournment of the trial on the  
burglary charge.

**1.** The Murder Proceedings.

On 2 December 1985, at the trial in the C.C.C., the applicant  
successfully challenged the admissibility of the statement made by him  
while in custody. The statement was ruled inadmissible on the basis  
that the power of arrest and detention given pursuant to section 30 of  
the 1939 Act applied only to offences with a subversive element which  
was not present in the particular circumstances of the case. Since the  
D.P.P. had no other evidence against the applicant the judge directed  
the jury to record a verdict of not guilty of murder and the applicant  
was discharged.

On 25 and 26 February 1986 the Supreme Court heard the appeal of  
the D.P.P.. It was the first ever appeal against an acquittal but the  
judgment of the C.C.C. (as it then stood) would have had a large impact  
on police powers of arrest and on others arrested and detained pursuant  
to Section 30 of the 1939 Act. The issues of law before the Supreme  
Court on this occasion were similar to those dealt with in the C.C.C..

On 25 July 1986 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment,  
reversing the trial judge's ruling, holding that section 30 applied to  
any offence scheduled in the 1939 Act whether or not motivated by any  
subversive intent.

On 16 December 1986, pursuant to that reversal, the D.P.P.  
sought, by Notice of Motion to the Supreme Court, liberty to re-try the  
applicant on the murder charge. This was the first ever application to  
direct the re-trial of a person on a murder charge.

On 3 February 1987, the written submissions of the D.P.P. were  
delivered. Pursuant to an application by the D.P.P. on 4 June 1987, the  
applicant delivered his replying submissions on or about the  
17 June 1987. The issues before the Supreme Court this time included  
questions as to whether the Supreme Court could order a re-trial under  
the rules of the courts or pursuant to a particular statutory  
provision. The constitutionality of the aforementioned statutory  
provision was also in issue.

On 21 July 1987 the Supreme Court hearing on the application to  
re-try the applicant took place. On 29 July 1988 the Supreme Court  
refused the motion to re-try the applicant.

**2.** The Burglary Proceedings.

The applicant's trial for burglary had been adjourned from time  
to time since November 1985 while the murder proceedings were in  
progress. The applicant did not object to such adjournments nor apply  
to have the burglary trial proceeded with.

On the 4 October 1988 the matter came before the C.C.C. for  
mention, for the first time since the conclusion of the proceedings in  
respect of the murder charge, when it was adjourned "by consent" of  
both parties. The trial was subsequently adjourned twice "by consent"  
of both parties until 17 April 1989 when a trial date was fixed for  
20 May 1989.

On the 1 May 1989 the D.P.P. applied for, and the applicant  
opposed, another adjournment. The adjournment was granted and the trial  
was fixed for hearing on 27 June 1989. On the trial date the case was  
adjourned until the following day, when the D.P.P. applied for, and the  
applicant consented to, another adjournment for several weeks due to  
the sudden illness of a prosecution witness.

The trial eventually commenced on the 31 October 1989. On the  
16 November 1989 the applicant was found guilty and was sentenced to  
8 years imprisonment.

By notice dated 8 December 1989 the applicant appealed his  
conviction. However it took until February 1991 before the necessary  
transcript of evidence of the burglary trial was received and approved  
by the trial judge.

There is a conflict on the facts in respect of the next  
developments in the case.

The Government claim that the applicant's solicitor was not  
contactable "for some considerable time" after February 1991  
resulting in the applicant's Books of Appeal not being delivered  
until October 1991 when they should have been delivered by  
February 1991.

The applicant submits that his solicitor contacted the Supreme  
Court office prior to March 1991 in order to let that office know  
his new address as the applicant's solicitor had moved his  
practice. The applicant further submits that his solicitor became  
aware of the availability of the C.C.C.'s transcript in March  
1991 and was informed by the Supreme Court office that further  
documentation would be required for the appeal. It is further  
confirmed by the applicant that the applicant's paperwork for the  
appeal was in order by July 1991 at which time the applicant  
realised that an amendment was required to the Notice of Appeal.  
Due to the court vacation (August and September) the relevant  
application for leave to amend could not be made until October  
1991 at which time the applicant's application to amend his  
Notice of Appeal was successful. The applicant's Books of Appeal  
were delivered shortly thereafter in October 1991.

The case appeared in the Supreme Court list from September 1991  
awaiting a hearing date.

On 11 and 12 February 1992 the applicant's appeal against  
conviction on the burglary charge was heard by the Supreme Court and  
judgment was given against him on 14 July 1992. There was a wide range  
of issues raised before the C.C.C. and the Supreme Court in the  
hearings on the burglary charge including the constitutionality of  
Section 30 of the 1939 Act, the length of the proceedings, the  
separation of the two charges, the trial judges findings on the  
admissibility of the applicant's alleged statement and the directions  
given to the jury by the trial judge.

On 30 July 1992 the applicant's appeal against sentence was heard  
by the Supreme Court and rejected.

During the period of the above hearings the applicant was  
detained from the date of his arrest, 19 November 1984, to  
25 January 1985 when he was released on bail. He was again detained for  
four days during the C.C.C. trial in December 1985. He was not detained  
again until his conviction on the burglary charge in November 1989 and  
he remains in prison to date.

B.   Relevant domestic law and practice

Separation of Proceedings.

In 1985, the possibility of including a number of charges (one  
being murder) on the same indictment was a relatively recent phenomenon  
in Ireland.

Prior to 1924 it was not possible to combine any charges on the  
same indictment regardless of the nature of the charges. The Criminal  
Justice (Administration) Act, 1924 made it possible to combine a number  
of charges, however, a murder charge could still not be combined with  
another charge on the same indictment. Subsequently, the Supreme Court,  
held in 1977 that it was possible ("not improper") for other counts to  
be joined with murder.

This ruling of the Supreme Court meant that when the application  
was made in 1985 by the D.P.P. to separate both sets of proceedings the  
court had the option of granting the separation or not. The application  
of the D.P.P. was made in order to relieve the defence, the jury and  
the prosecution from the additional burden imposed by the less serious  
charge of burglary in order to allow those persons to concentrate on  
the murder charge.

The issue of the separation of the two charges was raised by the  
applicant as a ground of appeal to the Supreme Court in the burglary  
proceedings. Finlay C.J. noted in this regard:

"No opposition to this separation of the two counts on the  
indictment was made on behalf of this Appellant in December 1985.  
There are strong grounds of policy to be found in a number of  
decisions in favour of not trying with the charge of murder a  
count of other crimes arising out of the same transaction even  
though that is not an inflexible or mandatory prohibition. No  
grounds have been advanced which in my view would suggest that  
the decision to separate the counts on that occasion was in any  
way unfair to the Appellant."

## COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that the length of the proceedings  
against him exceeded the reasonable time requirement provided for in  
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

## PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The applicant's solicitor wrote to the Commission, by letter  
dated 24 September 1992, requesting an application form in respect of  
a sentence of imprisonment which had been imposed on the applicant and  
in respect of which the applicant claimed a violation of his human  
rights. Subsequently the Commission received, by fax, on  
28 January 1993 the relevant facts in detail together with a list of  
the applicant's complaints including a general complaint under Article  
6 of the Convention. The completed application form was received by the  
Commission on the 29 March 1993 and was registered under No. 21624/93  
on 6 April 1993.

On 11 January 1994, the Commission declared inadmissible part of  
the application and decided to communicate the question concerning  
length of proceedings under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention to the  
respondent Government and to ask for written observations on the  
admissibility and merits of this question.

The Government's observations were submitted on 5 April 1994  
after one extension in the time-limit fixed for this purpose, and the  
applicants' observations in reply were submitted on 3 June 1994, also  
after one extension in the time-limit.

On 17 May 1994, the Commission decided to grant legal aid to the  
applicant.

## THE LAW

The applicant complains about the length of criminal proceedings  
against him under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

The Government raise various arguments against the admissibility  
of the applicant's complaint and on the merits.

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

The Government argue that the applicant's initial letter of the  
24 September 1992 did not constitute an application to the Commission  
but rather a request for an application form and that the more detailed  
second letter of the applicant, dated 27 January 1993, was received by  
the Commission on 3 February 1993. Thus the Government submits that the  
applicant failed to introduce his application within the six month time  
limit imposed by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

The Commission notes that it does not have to deal with the  
question of the status of the letter of 24 September 1992 because the  
detailed letter outlining the facts of the case and the broad  
complaints of the applicant (dated 27 January 1993) was received by fax  
on 28 January 1993. Thus the Commission finds that the application was  
introduced at the latest on the 28 January 1993 which was within six  
months of the final decision, given on 30 July 1992, when the Supreme  
Court delivered its judgment on the applicant's appeal against  
sentence.

No specific complaint made by the applicant under Article 6 para. 1  
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

The Government submit that no specific complaint was made as to  
the length of proceedings, or indeed under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)  
of the Convention, in the applicant's initial letters or in the  
application form submitted by the applicant. The Government also argue  
that even if the Commission can consider issues other than those raised  
by the applicant then it must do so within six months of the date of  
the final decision. It is therefore contended by the Government that  
the decision by the Commission to deal with the issue under Article 6  
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is inconsistent with Articles 25  
and 26 (Art. 25, 26) of the Convention.

The Commission recalls that it may examine whether or not the  
facts submitted disclose a violation of the Convention even if the  
applicant has not complained about an issue directly (Eur. Court H.R.  
Neumeister judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 8, p. 41 para. 16).  
In addition the Commission recalls, that in the performance of its  
tasks, it is free to attribute to the facts of the case, as found to  
be established on the evidence before them, a characterisation in law  
different from that given by the applicant or, if need be, to view the  
facts in a different manner (Eur. Court H.R., Foti judgment of  
10 December 1982, Series A no. 52. p. 15, para. 44).

In this regard the Commission notes that the fax received on 28  
January 1993, within the six month time limit, set out the relevant  
facts concerning the criminal proceedings against the applicant in some  
detail and made a general claim in relation to Article 6 (Art. 6) of  
the Convention. The Commission therefore finds that it may examine  
whether the proceedings against the applicant disclose a violation of  
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as it is  
relevant, reads as follows:

"1. In the determination .... of any criminal charge against him,  
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a  
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal  
established by law...."

The criminal proceedings against the applicant, which commenced  
on 13 December 1984 and terminated with the judgment of the Supreme  
Court of 30 July 1992, lasted in total over 7 years and 7 months.

The applicant contends that the length of time in question cannot  
be regarded as reasonable. The Government submit that the proceedings  
did not, in all the circumstances, exceed a reasonable period of time  
having regard in particular to the exceptional complexity and  
importance of the substantive and procedural issues which arose in both  
sets of proceedings and to the conduct of the applicant in those  
proceedings.

According to the constant case-law of the Convention organs the  
reasonableness of the length of proceedings under Article 6 para. 1  
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention has to be assessed in each case in light  
of the particular circumstances of the case and by applying the  
following criteria: the complexity of the issues in the case, the  
conduct of the applicant and the conduct of the competent authorities.

Applying these criteria, and having regard to the circumstances  
of the case as they have been submitted by the parties, the Commission  
considers that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law  
which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on  
an examination of the merits. The application cannot therefore be  
regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article  
27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has  
been established.

## For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE without  
prejudging the merits.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the first Chamber

## (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (A. WEITZEL)

