# Europakommissionens beslut den 28 november 1994 i målet M.H. mot Förenade kungariket (nr 22162/93)

- Rubrik i HUDOC: M.H. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
- Slag: Europakommissionens beslut · språk: engelska · datum: 1994-11-28
- Ansökningsnummer: 22162/93
- ECLI: ECLI:CE:ECHR:1994:1128DEC002216293
- Artiklar (HUDOC): 3, 5, 5-4, 5-5, 6, 13
- Slutsats (HUDOC): Inadmissible
- Källa: Europadomstolen (HUDOC), © ECHR-CEDH: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2425
- Ratio Lex: https://ratiolex.se/internationell-ratt/europadomstolen/001-2425/

Elektronisk version. Den undertecknade texten i domstolens arkiv är den autentiska (art. 44.3 EKMR).

## AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 22162/93  
by M.H.  
against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on  
28 November 1994, the following members being present:

MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President  
S. TRECHSEL  
A. WEITZEL  
F. ERMACORA  
E. BUSUTTIL  
G. JÖRUNDSSON  
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK  
J.-C. SOYER  
H.G. SCHERMERS  
H. DANELIUS  
Mrs.  G.H. THUNE  
MM.   F. MARTINEZ  
C.L. ROZAKIS  
Mrs.  J. LIDDY  
MM.   L. LOUCAIDES  
J.-C. GEUS  
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ  
B. MARXER  
G.B. REFFI  
M.A. NOWICKI  
I. CABRAL BARRETO  
B. CONFORTI  
N. BRATZA  
I. BÉKÉS  
J. MUCHA  
E. KONSTANTINOV  
D. SVÁBY  
G. RESS

Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection  
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 29 April 1993 by  
M.H. against the United Kingdom and registered on 6 July 1993 under  
file No. 22162/93;

Having regard to:

-     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of  
the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

## THE FACTS

The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as  
follows.

The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen born in 1949 and is  
currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment in HM Prison Stocken.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

The applicant was convicted of the murder of an elderly man in  
1972.  He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

The applicant's sentence was reviewed by the Parole Board in or  
about 1984.  A release date was apparently set and he was transferred  
to a pre-release hostel under supervision.  Following a minor motoring  
offence, for which he was conditionally discharged by the court, he was  
recalled to prison.  His case was reviewed by the Parole Board in  
January 1986.  The Parole Board decided to defer the case until January  
1988 as a result of police investigations involving the applicant.

On 1 July 1987 the applicant was charged with three offences of  
incest and sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment.  To date the applicant  
claims he is innocent of those charges.

In 1988, the Parole Board set the next review for 1990. At that  
review, despite favourable reports from his prison, the case was set  
for further review in 1992. In 1992, the Board set the next review for  
December 1994 but recommended the applicant's transfer to an open  
prison.

In a letter dated 11 May 1993 from the Life Sentence Review  
Section of the Prison Service, the applicant was informed that his  
continued detention now depended upon the assessment of the potential  
risk he might pose to the public if released.

The applicant was transferred to an open prison in or around late  
1993 or early 1994. Since 1985 the applicant has been in six different  
prisons.

B.    Relevant domestic law and practice

In addition to the facts as submitted by the applicant the  
Commission has had regard to the outline of relevant domestic law and  
practice in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the  
Wynne case (judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no. 294-A, paras.  
12-23). In particular the Commission has noted the following:

1.   Life sentences

Murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment under  
the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965.

A life sentence may also be passed, in the exercise of the  
court's discretion, on a person convicted of any of the offences for  
which life imprisonment is provided by the relevant legislation as the  
maximum penalty for the offence concerned - a discretionary life  
sentence. Broadly speaking, the use of such a discretionary life  
sentence is reserved for cases where the offence is grave and it  
appears that the accused is a person of unstable character likely to  
commit such offences in the future, thus making him dangerous to the  
public in respect of his probable future behaviour unless there is a  
change in his condition.

The Criminal Justice Act 1991 ("the 1991 Act") introduced changes  
to the procedures for the release of discretionary life prisoners to  
reflect the fact that reviews, complying with Article 5 para. 4 of the  
Convention, are required in respect of the non-punitive period of  
discretionary life sentences. These changes were not extended to  
mandatory life prisoners.

In the course of the debate in the House of Commons in respect  
of what was to become the 1991 Act, the Minister of State for Home  
Affairs explained, inter alia, the difference between mandatory and  
discretionary life sentences, and described mandatory life sentences  
as follows:

"The nature of the mandatory sentence is different. The element  
of risk is not the decisive factor in handing down a life  
sentence. According to the judicial process, the offender has  
committed a crime of such gravity that he forfeits his liberty  
to the state for the rest of his days. If necessary he can be  
detained for life without the necessity for a subsequent judicial  
intervention."

However the English courts have recognised, in determining the  
principles of fairness that apply to the procedures governing the  
review of mandatory life sentences, that the mandatory sentence is,  
like the discretionary sentence, composed of both a punitive period  
("the tariff") and a security period, the latter period being linked  
to the assessment of the prisoner's risk to the public following the  
expiry of the tariff.

The English courts have also recognised that there continues to  
be a gap between the theory and practice in respect of mandatory life  
sentences (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte  
Doody [1993] 3 All England Reports 92). In that case Lord Mustill, with  
whom the other Law Lords agreed, went on to state that, while the  
mandatory life sentence may be converging with the discretionary life  
sentence, nevertheless there remained a substantial gap between the two  
types of sentences and it would be a task for Parliament to further  
assimilate the effect of the two types of life sentences.

2.   Release of life prisoners on licence and revocation of a  
licence

The Criminal Justice Act 1967 ("the 1967 Act") contained the  
relevant statutory provisions in respect of Parole Board reviews and  
the powers of the Secretary of State in this regard. These provisions  
have been incorporated into the 1991 Act since October 1992 and  
continue to apply to mandatory life prisoners.

Pursuant to the above legislation the Secretary of State may  
release on licence a person only if recommended to do so by the Parole  
Board, and after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice of England  
and the trial Judge if available. The decision on whether to release  
is, however, for the Secretary of State alone.

Broadly speaking, once a release date is fixed, a prisoner may  
be transferred to a pre-release hostel as part of a pre-release  
programme during which time the prisoner continues to be assessed.

The Secretary of State may revoke the licence of a person either  
on his own initiative or on the recommendation of the Parole Board. If  
a person subject to a licence is convicted on indictment of an offence,  
the trial court may, whether or not it passes any other sentence on  
him, revoke the licence.

The effect of the revocation of a licence, whether by a Secretary  
of State or a court, is that the person is liable to be re-detained in  
pursuance of his original sentence (formerly section 62(9) of the 1967  
Act).

## COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention in  
relation to alleged mental distress caused by the length of his  
detention and the delays between each Parole Board review. He also  
complains under Article 5 paras. 4 and 5 of the Convention as regards  
the procedure for determining the continued lawfulness of his  
detention. Next he complains of a violation of Article 6 paras. 1, 2  
and 3 of the Convention in relation to the alleged absence of a fair  
trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, the length of  
proceedings, the presumption of innocence and the right to a proper  
defence.

The applicant then claims under Articles 7, 8 and 14 of the  
Convention, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that he  
has served a heavier penalty than was applicable at the time the  
offence was committed; that his family life has been interrupted; that  
he has been discriminated against (as regards fixed term prisoners and  
civilians) and that the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions has been  
interrupted.

Finally, the applicant invokes Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No.  
4 and Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, as well as  
Article 13 of the Convention, the latter on the basis that allegedly  
he has no effective remedy before a national authority.

## PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 29 April 1993 and was  
registered on 6 July 1993.

On 11 October 1993 the Commission decided to communicate the  
applicant's complaints under Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention to the  
respondent Government without requesting observations.

By letter dated 4 August 1994 the Secretariat of the Commission  
provided the applicant with a copy of the judgment of the Court in the  
Wynne case (Eur. Court H.R., Wynne judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A  
294-A), requesting the applicant to inform the Commission whether, in  
light of that judgment, the applicant wished to maintain his case.

By letter received on 18 August 1994 the applicant confirmed that  
he wished to continue with his application.

On 3 September 1994 the Commission decided to continue its  
examination of the admissibility of the application without seeking the  
observations of the Government.

## THE LAW

**1.** The applicant complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the  
Convention in relation to the mental distress caused by the length of  
his ongoing detention and the delays between each Parole Board review.

Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads as follows:

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading  
treatment or punishment."

The Commission recalls that Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention  
cannot be read as requiring that an individual serving a sentence of  
life imprisonment must have that sentence reconsidered by a national  
authority (judicial or administrative) with a view to its remission or  
termination (No. 11635/85, Dec. 3.3.86, D.R. 46 p. 237). In the present  
case the Commission notes that the applicant is serving a sentence of  
life imprisonment.

As to whether there are particular factors in the present case  
which would bring the applicant's detention within the scope of Article  
3 (Art. 3) of the Convention the Commission recalls that, according to  
the constant case-law of the Convention organs, the treatment in  
respect of which an applicant complains must attain a minimum level of  
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the  
Convention. The assessment of the minimum is relative and depends,  
therefore, on all the circumstances of the case (see, for example,  
No. 8463/78, Dec. 9.7.81, D.R. 26 p. 49 and Eur. Court H.R., Ireland  
v. United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65,  
para. 162).

The Commission has examined all of the submissions of the  
applicant but does not consider that, in the circumstances of this  
case, the treatment of which the applicant complains reaches the  
threshold of severe ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3 (Art. 3) of  
the Convention. The Commission therefore finds the applicant's  
complaint under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention manifestly ill-  
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the  
Convention.

**2.** The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the  
Convention in relation to the Parole Board reviews which have been  
conducted in respect of his detention. He also complains under Article  
5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention that he has no enforceable right  
to compensation in this regard.

Article 5 paras. 4 and 5 (Art. 5-4, 5-5) of the Convention read  
as follows:

"4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or  
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the  
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court  
and his release ordered if his detention is not lawful.

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in  
contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an  
enforceable right to compensation."

The Commission recalls the judgment of the European Court of  
Human Rights in the case of Wynne v. the United Kingdom (Eur. Court  
H.R., judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no. 294-A). In that case the  
applicant received a mandatory life sentence and was released on  
licence, which licence was subsequently revoked. It was found by the  
Court that the legal basis for his continuing detention was a mandatory  
life sentence (although "supplemented" by a subsequent discretionary  
life sentence).

The applicant in the Wynne case submitted that the distinction  
between mandatory and discretionary life sentences, set out in the  
Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell case (Eur. Court H.R., Thynne, Wilson and  
Gunnell judgment of 25 October 1990, Series A no. 190), was no longer  
valid referring in support of his arguments to recent domestic  
practices, case-law and official pronouncements. Therefore, the  
applicant in the Wynne case argued that he was entitled to a review  
complying with Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention. The  
Court in the Wynne case (loc. cit., paras. 35-36), however, found as  
follows:

"..... the fact remains that the mandatory life sentence belongs  
to a different category from the discretionary sentence in the  
sense that it is imposed automatically as the punishment for the  
offence of murder irrespective of considerations pertaining to  
the dangerousness of the offender ..... That mandatory life  
prisoners do not actually spend the rest of their lives in prison  
and that a notional tariff period is also established in such  
cases - facts of which the Court was fully aware in Thynne,  
Wilson and Gunnell ..... - does not alter this essential  
distinction between the two types of life sentence .....

..... Against the above background, the Court sees no cogent  
reasons to depart from the finding in the Thynne, Wilson and  
Gunnell case that, as regards mandatory life sentences, the  
guarantee of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) was satisfied by the  
original trial and appeal proceedings and confers no additional  
right to challenge the lawfulness of continuing detention or re-  
detention following revocation of the life sentence .....  
Accordingly, in the circumstances of the present case, there are  
no new issues of lawfulness which entitle the applicant to a  
review of his continued detention under the original mandatory  
life sentence."

In the present case the Commission notes that the applicant was  
sentenced to a mandatory life sentence and was released on licence,  
which licence was revoked following his conviction for another offence.  
It is also noted that the applicant was then re-detained in pursuance  
of the original mandatory life sentence (section 62 (9) of the 1967 Act  
and the equivalent provision in the 1991 Act).

The Commission further notes that the applicant has submitted no  
evidence to demonstrate that the character of the mandatory life  
sentence has changed in domestic law. It remains a sentence imposed  
automatically as punishment for the offence of murder irrespective of  
considerations pertaining to the dangerousness of the offender. The  
Commission therefore finds, as did the Court in the above-mentioned  
Wynne case, that the applicant has advanced no cogent reason to depart  
from the finding in the Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell case (loc. cit.).

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the guarantees  
provided by Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention were  
satisfied by the original trial and appeal proceedings (if any) of the  
applicant. It finds that no new issues of lawfulness arose in relation  
to the applicant's detention which entitled the applicant to a review  
under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.

As no appearance of a violation of either paragraph 4 or  
paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 5 (Art. 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4) of the  
Convention has been established in the present case, the applicant is  
not entitled to an enforceable right to compensation under Article 5  
para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention.

It follows that the Commission must reject the complaints of the  
applicant under Article 5 paras. 4 and 5 (Art. 5-4, 5-5) of the  
Convention as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2  
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

**3.** The applicant next complains under Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3  
(Art. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3) of the Convention, but does not specify the nature  
of the alleged violation of these provisions.

Insofar as the applicant raises Article 6 (Art. 6) of the  
Convention in relation to the conduct of the Parole Board reviews, the  
Commission notes that it has already considered this aspect of the case  
in the context of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention, being  
the lex specialis in the matter. The Commission does not find it  
necessary, therefore, to reconsider it in the light of Article 6  
(Art. 6) of the Convention.

Insofar as the applicant raises Article 6 (Art. 6) of the  
Convention in relation to his conviction in 1988, the Commission  
recalls its constant case-law to the effect that it is not competent  
to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have  
been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such  
errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights  
and freedoms set out in the Convention (cf., for example, No. 7987/77,  
Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45). However the Commission considers  
that the applicant, apart from professing his innocence of the relevant  
charges, has not raised any matter in his application that would  
demonstrate that his trial or conviction in 1988 involved a violation  
of any provision of the Convention.

In conclusion, the Commission has examined the case-file, but  
finds no evidence which might disclose any appearance of a violation  
of Article 6 paras. 1, 2 or 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3) of the Convention.  
The Commission must therefore reject the complaints of the applicant  
under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded  
pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

**4.** The applicant also complains that he has served a heavier  
sentence than was applicable at the time of his conviction, that his  
family life has been disrupted, that he has been discriminated against  
and that the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions has been  
interrupted. He invokes Articles 7, 8 and 14 (Art. 7, 8, 14) of the  
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in this  
regard, which guarantee, inter alia, freedom from retroactive criminal  
penalties, the right to respect for private and family life, freedom  
from discrimination in the securement of Convention rights and the  
right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, respectively.

However, the Commission finds no element of retroactivity in the  
sentences imposed on the applicant for his crimes. It also finds no  
evidence in the case of any interference with the applicant's right to  
respect for private and family life which would not be justified in a  
democratic society for the prevention of disorder or crime. Nor does  
it find any evidence of discrimination or unjustified interference with  
the applicant's property rights.

It follows that this part of the application must also be  
rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article  
27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

**5.** The applicant then complains under Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol  
No. 4 and Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P4-1, P4-2, P7-3, P7-4)  
to the Convention, which concern, inter alia, detention on civil  
matters, liberty of movement, compensation for a miscarriage of justice  
and the principle of "ne bis in idem", respectively.

However, the Commission notes that the United Kingdom has not  
ratified these two Protocols to the Convention. Therefore, the  
Commission has no competence to deal with this aspect of the  
applicant's case, which must be rejected as being incompatible ratione  
personae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 27  
para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

**7.** Finally, the applicant invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the  
Convention, claiming that he does not have an effective remedy before  
a national authority in respect of his complaints.

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides as follows:

"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this  
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a  
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been  
committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

However, the case-law of the Convention organs establishes that  
Article 13 (Art. 13) does not require a remedy in domestic law for all  
claims alleging a breach of the Convention; the claim must be an  
arguable one (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of  
27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52). In the light of the  
above conclusions concerning the applicant's other complaints under the  
Convention and Protocols, the Commission finds that the applicant does  
not have an arguable claim of a breach of his rights and freedoms which  
warrants a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13).

It follows that this part of the application must also be  
rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article  
27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

## For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

## DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission       President of the Commission

## (H.C. KRÜGER)                     (C.A. NØRGAARD)

