Sök i Ratio Lex

Paluda v. Slovakia

23 maj 2017 · nr 33392/12


Så kom texten hit

  • Källa: Europadomstolen (HUDOC), © ECHR-CEDH · dokumentet i HUDOC
  • Text: domstolens egen text på engelska, utläst ur HUDOC:s HTML. Styckenumren är domens; varje stycke har en egen adress (#p1, #p2 …).
  • Hämtad hit: 14 november 2026
  • Villkor: Domstolens texter återges med källan angiven (© ECHR-CEDH), avgiftsfritt och i informationssyfte, enligt domstolens villkor (echr.coe.int, Copyright and Disclaimer). Den elektroniska versionen ges ut enligt artikel 44.3 i konventionen; den undertecknade texten i domstolens arkiv är den autentiska. Icke-officiella översättningar i HUDOC är skyddade av upphovsrätt och står här bara som länk.

Uppgifter ur HUDOC

  • Artiklar: Artikel 6; Artikel 41;
  • Slutsats: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Disciplinary proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Civil rights and obligations);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
  • Betydelse enligt domstolen: nivå 3
  • Målet: alla dokument och språkversioner (2)

Citera

Europadomstolens sammanfattning av avgörandet den 23 maj 2017 i målet Paluda mot Slovakien (nr 33392/12)

Domstolens text

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 207

May 2017

Paluda v. Slovakia - 33392/12

Judgment 23.5.2017 [Section III]

Article 6

Disciplinary proceedings

Article 6-1

Access to court

Judge’s inability to obtain judicial review of his suspension from office while disciplinary proceedings were pending: violation

Facts – In September 2009 the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic (the supreme governing body of the judiciary in Slovakia which was then presided over by the President of the Supreme Court) decided to suspend the applicant from his duties as a Supreme Court judge and to initiate disciplinary charges against him. The applicant was alleged, in particular, to have filed a criminal complaint accusing the President of the Supreme Court of abuse of authority and to have publicly stated that the President had sought to influence the outcome of proceedings. The suspension, which under the relevant legislation could last up to two years, entailed a 50% reduction in the applicant’s salary. The applicant’s attempts to challenge his suspension were unsuccessful. His appeal to the Judicial Council was rejected on the grounds that it was a matter for the administrative courts. The administrative courts ruled that the decision to suspend the applicant was of a preliminary nature, had not amounted to a determination of his rights with final effect and as such had no bearing on his fundamental rights and freedoms. The applicant’s complaints to the Constitutional Court were declared inadmissible.

In the Convention proceedings, the applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that he had been denied access to court to challenge the order suspending him from office.

Law – Article 6 § 1: The applicant’s suspension was imposed by the Judicial Council – a body that was not of a judicial character and did not provide the institutional and procedural guarantees inherent in Article 6 § 1 – within the context of disciplinary proceedings the Judicial Council had instituted. The applicant was not heard in respect of either the suspension or the underlying disciplinary charges.

The applicant had no access to proceedings before a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 to challenge a suspension that had placed him for two years in the situation of being unable to exercise his judicial mandate and having one half of his salary withheld, while at the same time being unable to exercise any other gainful activity.

The Government had not invoked any conclusive reason for denying him judicial protection in respect of that measure. In that connection, it was important to draw a clear distinction between the arguably compelling reasons for suspending a judge facing a certain type of disciplinary charge and the reasons for not allowing him or her access to a tribunal in respect of the suspension. In the Court’s view, the importance of this distinction was amplified by the fact that the body taking the measure and the procedure in the course of which it was taken fell short of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 and the fact that the measure was taken in a context as particular as that which had obtained in the applicant’s case.

The applicant’s lack of access to court could not, therefore, have been proportionate to any legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, the very essence of his right had been impaired.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 41: EUR 7,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; claim in respect of pecuniary damage dismissed.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes

Målets dokument (2)

  1. Dom, 23 maj 2017 · engelska
  2. Sammanfattning, 23 maj 2017 (denna sida) · engelska